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1. Introduction 
 
The increasing presence of global value chains (GVCs) has been considered one of the most important 
features of rapid economic globalization. The representative phenomena relating to the context of GVCs 
include ―vertical specialization,‖ ―fragmentation production,‖ ―outsourcing,‖ and ―global supply chains.‖ 
Despite the use of different terms or ―language‖ to explain these phenomena or having just a partial 
perspective of these phenomena, all of them indicate the same fact: a higher volume of intermediate 
goods, such as parts and components, is produced in subsequential stages or processes across different 
countries, and then exported to other countries for further production. This phenomenon is explained by 
the so-called second unbundling (Baldwin, 2011). Namely, lower communication costs resulting from the 
information and communication technology (ICT) revolution has enabled the international unbundling of 
factories and offices, which means that tasks can also be traded globally. The production systems of 
Apple‘s products (Linden et al., 2009; Dedrick et al., 2010; and Xing and Detert, 2010) and Boeing‘s 
Dream 787 commercial airplane (Carson, 2007) are the most famous and widely quoted examples to 
explain the rapid spread of GVCs. 
 
In contrast, given the current difficulties and challenges faced by the WTO after the Doha Round 
negotiation, the discussion on regional economic integration and regional trade agreements (RTAs), as 
well as their effects, has received much more attention from both academia and the government (Murray, 
2011; Neffke and Boschma, 2011; and Sierra, 2011). Such movement is primarily attributable to the fact 
that the trade pattern in the 21st century—the second unbundling—requires new disciplines that go far 
beyond the WTO‘s current rulebook. In other words, ―developing nations wanted the offshored industrial 
jobs and technology, rich-nation firms wanted access to lower-cost labour. Both pushed for disciplines to 
underpin the trade-investment-services-IP nexus. The result was ‗deep‘ regional trade agreements and 
unilateral pro-business reforms by developing nations‖ (Baldwin, 2012). The interaction among countries 
within the same region and the interdependence in regional trade and production networks have very 
important implications for economic development as well as for international business activity locations.  
 
Given the importance of understanding the mechanism and structure of regional integration, a number of 
studies have been conducted in this field using different approaches and data sources. One study is the 
politically based approach that employs macrodata to analyze the influence of harmonized laws and 
regulations (Suder, 2008; Murray, 2010; and Cherry, 2011). The other approaches focus on the economic 
effects from the integration of countries or economies through normalized economic agreements such as 
FTA, EPA, and RATs (Dunning, 2007; Hiratsuka and Kimura, 2008; Volz, 2011; and Batra, 2012). In 
addition, the data sources used in the previous studies vary according to different model requirements and 
analytical purposes. For example, UNCTAD (2009), Pula and Peltonen (2009), and Suder et al. (2011) 
used FDI and trade statistics to show the economic rationale of regional integration; Rugman and 
Verbeke (2004) and Piekkari et al. (2010) utilized firm-based data, such as foreign MNE sales, to analyze 
regional integration from a firm‘s perspective. However, just a few studies concentrated on the structural 
change of production networks, supply chains, and industry clusters using international input–output 
(I–O) data when considering the effects of regional economic integration (Hoen, 2002; Shrestha and 
Hasebe, 2006; and Kuroiwa and Heng, 2008). 
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The main objective of this study is to apply the newly developed I–O-based GVC indicators
1
 to show the 
structural change in the ongoing regional economic integration for regions such as NAFTA, Europe, and 
Asia from the viewpoint of production networks and international spillover effects. Comparing and 
measuring the process and degree of regional economic integration for different regions can provide very 
constructive opinions for future policy design concerning the economic development of the Asian region.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses trade data to show the evolution of 
global trade structure and the role of trade in intermediate goods. Section 3 first explains how to use the 
I–O framework to measure GVCs. Second, the relationship between the concepts of value added in trade 
(VAiT) and trade in value added (TiVA) is discussed. Then, an alternative measurement of the 
comparative advantage based on the newly defined individual linkage of TiVA is proposed. In addition, 
this section shows how to use the I–O framework to measure ―who produces intermediate goods for 
whom.‖ In Section 4, the features and changing pattern of regional economic integration and GVCs are 
discussed on the basis of the calculation results of the measurement proposed in Section 3. Section 5 
presents concluding remarks. 
 
2. Evolution of global trade and the role of trade for intermediate goods 
 
This section uses the up-to-date OECD bilateral trade database (BTDIxE, 1988–2010) to show the 
historical evolution of the global trade structure at both industrial level (ISIC 3.0 with 37 sectors) and 
end-use category level (primarily separated as intermediate goods, final consumption goods, and capital 
goods). In addition, to understand the role of different categories and countries in the growth of global 
trade, the movement of ―trade hubs‖ (supply and demand centers) by the end-use category is presented. 
 
2.1 Historical evolution of international non-fuel merchandise trade 
 
Using the OECD BTDIxE database
2
, the historical evolution of trade in goods by different end-use 
categories is clearly illustrated in Figure 1. The chart makes apparent that the entire evolution from 1995 
to 2010 is divided into three main phases. In the first phase, during 1995–2002, total trade in goods 
showed slow growth and reached a slight peak in 2000. In the second phase, 2002–2008, world trade 
significantly increased compared with that in the first phase. In the third phase, 2008–2010, world trade 
was heavily damaged from the financial crisis and the ensuing world economic crisis, but showed a rapid, 
V-shaped recovery from 2009.  
 
A comparison of movement of trade by category clearly shows that trade in intermediate goods is 
considered the main driving power of the world‘s total trade in goods. Particularly during the crisis, trade 
in intermediate goods seemed to show very sensitive patterns of change that can explain the main source 
                                                   
1For recent I–O-based GVC indicators, refer to Hummels et al. (2001), Kuroiwa, (2006), Escaith (2008), Koopman et al. 
(2008, 2010), Uchida and Inoamata (2009), Yang et al. (2009), Timmer (2010), Johnson and Noguera (2011), Fukasaku et 
al. (2011), Meng et al. (2011), Ahmad et al. (2011), Abdul et al. (2011), Stehrer (2012), and Backer and Yamano (2012). 
2Note that goods such as passenger cars, personal computers, packed medicaments, and personal phones may be used by 
firms as intermediate inputs and capital formation, or are directly consumable by households. Therefore, in the OECD 
BTDIxE database, these items are treated as an individual category.  
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of the V-shaped recovery of total trade. The movement of intermediate goods also clearly reflects 
increased globalization and the development of fragmented production in manufacturing sectors. 
However, calculations of the share of each category in total trade (Figure 2) clearly confirm that all 
categories remained very stable over the last 15 years. This fact indicates that, at the absolute level, the 
contribution of different categories to total trade is stable; however, given the differences in their shares 
and growth rates, the relative contribution by category may indicate a different pattern. 
 
To provide detailed information on contribution by category, we calculate the relative contribution of 
different categories to the growth in total trade in goods by considering together the absolute share of an 
individual category in total trade and its growth rate (for the detailed calculation method, see Appendix 1). 
The calculation results of relative contribution by category are shown in Figure 3. Clearly, trade in 
intermediate goods represents the dominant contribution to growth in total trade for both periods 
(1996–2002 and 2002–2008), followed by household consumption and capital goods. A review of shares 
by different category over time shows significant changes. Intermediate goods enhanced their presence 
from 40.43% to 57.01%, indicating that the increasing performance of these goods was the primary 
reason for the rapid growth of global trade after 2002. Compared to the relatively stable tendency for 
household consumption goods, the contribution from capital goods almost doubled over time from 9.6% 
to 16.5%, making capital goods the second main source of the rapid growth of total trade in goods during 
2002–2008. In contrast, contributions from all other categories such as passenger cars, packed 
medicaments, and personal computers declined over time.  
 
Several factors may help explaining the above dynamic changes in global merchandise trade. First, the 
continuous reduction in international trade costs, including tariff and non-tariff costs, is one of the most 
important factors. In particular, note that during the last 20 years, tariffs on intermediate goods such as 
parts and components have usually been lower than those on final goods (Miroudot, 2009). Such lower 
tariffs boosted the volume and diversity of parts and components exchanged all over the world. The 
second factor is the active cross-border movement of capital, such as foreign direct investment (FDI), 
which has played an important role in the expansion of trade in intermediate goods (Miroudot, 2009). 
Simultaneously, related to the first and second factors, the increasing fragmentation of value chains, 
particularly the so-called intrafirm trade, could spread globally and has led to an increase in trade flows of 
intermediate goods (Yi, 2003). Finally, domestic-market-oriented economic reforms undertaken in certain 
developing economies such as China should also be considered a very important factor because their 
domestic economic reforms provide significant opportunities for countries or multinational enterprises to 
locate there and to be involved in global production networks. 
 
Similarly, the country-specific contribution rate can be computed from the supply (export) and demand 
(import) sides
3
. On the supply side, the top 30 contributors are listed in Table 1. For both periods, without 
considering the contribution from the rest of the world, the top 30 countries/regions account for more 
than 90% of the total contribution. As per a review of country-specific contributions, China shows the 
                                                   
3Note that trade data can be collected in two ways. One is from export statistics and the other is from import statistics. In 
principle, because import statistics follow the ―rule of origin,‖ the so-called ―mirror statistic problem‖ (a country‘s exports 
may not equal its partner‘s imports) caused by re-export can supposedly be avoided using import data, to some extent. 
Therefore, in this paper, the trade data (export or import) used are both from C.I.F.-price-based import statistics. 
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largest figure, followed by Germany and the United States. Japan also enhanced its presence over time 
from 1.54% to 5.36%. This fact indicates that China, Germany, the United States, Japan, and France have 
played roles as the most important exporters in the rapid increase in global trade. On the other hand, a 
similar pattern is found in Table 2, namely that these main countries also make dominant contributions to 
the growth of global trade as importers. However, significantly more dynamic changes are found from 
the demand side than from the supply side. For example, the United States lost its dominant role and 
went from 34.59% to 9.15%; China‘s figure also declined, from 14.23% to 9.61% over the two periods. 
The lost shares by the United States and China were taken up by other economies, making the 
distribution of country-specific contributions much flatter across countries. In particular, the fact that the 
contribution from the rest of the world increased rapidly from 5.54% to 12.88% over the two periods may 
be considered evidence that an increasing number of smaller economies have been involved in the global 
trade system.  
 
2.2 Global trade hubs: supply and demand centers 
 
This section focuses on evaluating the movement of global trade hubs using the so-called ―dominant links‖ 
(Fukasaku et al., 2011) of trade flows in goods by different end-use categories. As a dominant link, a 
country‘s exports in goods to a particular partner country exceeding a given threshold percentage of that 
country‘s total imports are considered. The current exercise uses 10% as the threshold when exploring 
trade nodes. If a relatively large number of countries‘ imports depend on exports (supply of goods for 
foreign use) of a specific country, this country may be considered the supply center in global trade. 
Similarly, if a large number of countries‘ exports depend on imports (domestic demand for goods 
produced outside) of a specific country, this country may be considered the demand center. 
 
Given the bilateral trade data for 65 countries/regions by end-use categories, the supply and demand 
centers are easily identified (Figure 4). Obviously, larger industrialized economies are expected to be 
identified as dominant trade partners for smaller ones in respective regions, as differentiation and 
specialization take place around these larger economies. Closely analyzing Figure 4, some features are 
summarized as follows. (1) Germany maintains the leading position as the trade center for both supply 
and demand during the last 15 years. For example, more than 35 countries heavily depend on Germany‘s 
supply of intermediate goods. Simultaneously, more than 25 countries heavily depend on Germany‘s 
demand of intermediate goods. The most important feature for Germany is that its leading position can be 
maintained very stably over time. (2) The United States is one of the most important trade centers, but its 
presence has decreased rapidly in the last 15 years. For example, more than 25 countries shipped over 
10% of their exports of intermediate goods to the United States in 2000. However, this figure for the 
United States declined to 10 in 2010. (3) Compared to the United States, China showed very different 
changes. In particular, China‘s supply power increased dramatically after its accession of the WTO in 
2001. This situation can be easily confirmed by analyzing the supply of final consumption goods. In 1995, 
just 10 countries had relatively high dependence on China‘s products of final goods. However, in 2010, 
more than 45 countries had more than 10% of their imports from China, reflecting why the country is 
called the ―world factory.‖ The increasing presence of China‘s supply power is also seen with 
intermediate and capital goods. In 2010, China was the largest supply center for final consumption goods 
and the second largest supply center for intermediate and capital goods. In contrast, the country was also 
the second largest demand center for intermediate goods. Not surprisingly, China has been deeply 
involved in global supply chains by using a significant volume of imported intermediate goods to 
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produce goods for export throughout the world. However, unlike Germany, China is not yet an important 
demand center for final consumption goods relative to its supply power. Several reasons explain this 
phenomenon. The first reason is that China‘s purchasing power related to foreign consumption goods is 
still low because of its relatively low per capita income. The second reason is that a high percentage of 
domestic demand for consumption goods from China‘s domestic consumers is satisfied by the country‘s 
domestic supply because of relatively low prices and large production capacity for these domestic goods. 
(4) Japan‘s movement is similar to Germany‘s, but its presence has decreased slowly over time.  
 
In general, China, to some extent, has taken the place of the United States and Japan in global 
merchandise trade. The United States lost its position as a leading supply and demand center in terms of 
trade in goods primarily because its economic (supply and demand) structure became more 
service-oriented or service-specialized. The United Kingdom also rapidly lost its supply and demand 
power in global trade for a very similar reason. For Japan, the same reason noted previously caused a 
transfer of some of its production capacity to neighboring countries, such as China, through FDI to 
capture lower labor costs and for other market-related reasons. 
 
3. Input–output-based measure of global value chains 
 
In the previous section, trade data provide us with a global and intuitive view for understanding the 
evolution of the trade structure. However, obtaining detailed information on how countries are linked to 
each other through GVCs is difficult. To measure the participation degree of a specific country in GVCs 
and the linkages among countries and country groups within GVCs, a preferable method is to utilize I–O 
tables. An I–O-based measurement can capture not only direct linkages, such as trade flow, but also 
indirect linkages, such as the spillover effect and the feedback effect among countries though 
international production networks. 
 
3.1 Concept and measurement of value added in trade in a single national I–O framework 
 
VAiT is simply defined as ―domestic value added embodied in trade (export or import)‖
4
. If ―trade‖ noted 
here indicates a home country‘s exports, VAiT measures the home country‘s domestic value added 
embodied in its exports. In turn, if ―trade‖ indicates the home country‘s imports, the VAiT indicates its 
partner country‘s domestic value added embodied in the home country‘s imports.  
 
To ease an explanation of VAiT, we model a closed economy with just two countries (r and s) and n 
sectors for each country. In the first step, only the information on country r‘s national I–O table with a 
separate import matrix is assumed to be known (Figure 5). In this single national I–O framework, country 
r‘s total value added is given in the following form on the basis of the traditional I–O theory. 
 
                     
                    
                        ,      (1) 
 
                                                   
4For a detailed discussion concerning the relationship between VAiT and TiVA, refer to Stehrer (2012). 
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where VA
r
 represents country r‘s total value added (scalar), v
r
 represents a (1 × n) row vector of value 
added ratios (the share of domestic value added in total input) by sector for country r, A
rr
 represents the (n 
× n) matrix of country r‘s domestic input coefficients, fd
r
 represents the (n × 1) column vector of country 
r‘s total final demand,               represents country r‘s domestic Leontief inverse in a single 
national I–O framework, fd
rr
 represents the column vector of country r‘s domestic final demand, and ex
rs
 
represents the (n × 1) vector of exports from country r to country s. Because this economy has just two 
countries, ex
rs
 naturally represents the total exports of country r. 
 
Clearly, a country‘s total value added is expressed in two parts, namely the value added embodied in the 
domestic final demand (           ) and the value added embodied in the total exports (       
    ). The second part is tentatively considered a measurement of the VAiT for country r when a single 
national I–O table is available for use. In addition, in a single national I–O framework, the following 
equation always holds: 
 
                   (2) 
 
where u represents a 1 × n unity vector and M represents the n × n matrix constructed by intermediate 
import coefficients. Multiplying country r‘s export vector with both sides of the previous equation yields 
 
                                      (3) 
 
Note that the second term on the left-hand side of Eq. (3) indicates the ―import contents of export‖ 
(Hummel et al., 2001). Clearly, a country‘s domestic value added embodied in its exports is measured by 
the difference in its total exports (      ) and the import contents of its exports. In other words, if 
country r does not need any intermediate imports for the production of exports, the measuring result of 
VAiT for country r should be the same figure for exports. 
 
In addition, if end-use based international trade statistics are available, country r‘s total exports are 
separated into intermediate and final products, as follows: 
 
               ,       (4) 
 
where      and       represent, respectively, country r‘s exports of final goods and intermediate 
goods shipped to country s (n × 1 column vector). By still using the single national I–O framework, 
country r‘s VAiT in terms of its final and intermediate goods exports is defined as follows: 
 
                         (5) 
                   ,       (6) 
 
where        and        represent the value added embodied in country r‘s exports of final goods 
(    ) and intermediate goods (     ), respectively. 
 
3.2 Measuring the trade in value added in an international I–O framework 
 
Adopting the single national I–O framework to measure VAiT enables easy measurement of VAi    
7
because country r‘s intermediate goods exports are treated as an exogenous variable. An important 
question arises. Namely, if an international I–O framework is given, intermediate goods exports should 
be considered an endogenous variable; in this situation, how is the VAiT measured for intermediate 
goods? To answer this question, the single national I–O framework of a closed economy used in Figure 5 
is expanded to a two-country international I–O framework (Figure 6) in which the trade of intermediate 
goods between these two countries is treated as an endogenous variable. On the basis of the traditional 
international I–O theory, the total value added is given as follows: 
 
               ,       (7) 
    
   
   
 ,          ,    
      
      
      
      
      
  
  
,     
    
    
   
    
    
 ,  
 
where va
r
 represents the (n × 1) column vector representing country r‘s value added by sector, v
r
 
represents the (1 × n) row vector of value added ratio by sector for country r, L represents the 
international Leontief inverse constructed by the submatrix L
rs
, A
rs
 represents the (n × n) matrix of 
international input coefficients from country r to country s, and fd
rs
 represents the (n × 1) column vector 
for country s‘s final demand for goods and services produced in country r. Following the definition of 
TiVA proposed by Johnson and Noguera (2009), formulating country r‘s value added exported to country 
s is easy, and is shown as follows: 
 
                         
      
      
   
    
    
 ,    (8) 
                                   (9) 
 
Because the above concept represents country r‘s value added induced by country s‘s final demands, this 
type of measure is called demand-based TiVA. According to Miller and Blair (1985), each submatrix in 
the international Leontief inverse can be expressed using the submatrix of input coefficients as follows: 
 
                                   
                      
                      
        
                         . 
 
Using previous equations,        is rewritten as follows: 
 
                             
                                                                 
                                                         ] 
                                                    
                 .       (10) 
 
Obviously,        is expressed through two types of VAiT. The first one,        , exactly represents 
country r‘s value added embodied in its exports of final goods shipped to country s when the single 
national I–O model is used (Eq. (5)). The second one,         , is defined as the cross-border value 
8
added in terms of trade in intermediate goods. A close analysis of the definition of          clearly 
shows that this part can be further separated into two: the value added induced by the trade in 
intermediate goods shipped from country r to country s caused by the feedback effect (        ) and the 
spillover effect (        ). Therefore, using this measurement, the contribution of trade in final and 
intermediate goods is separately evaluated within the international I–O model. 
 
Furthermore, at the product (sector) level, the induced value added in country r‘s specific sector j by 
country s‘s consumption on a specific final product i can be regarded as ―an individual TiVA linkage,‖ 
which is defined as follows: 
 
      
     
         
          
   .      (11) 
 
On the basis of the above definition, country r‘s export of sector j‘s value added to country s (      
  ) and 
country r‘s export of value added to country s in terms of the consumption of a specific final product i 
(      
  ) is measured, respectively, as follows: 
 
      
          
  
 ,       (12) 
      
          
  
 .       (13) 
 
In other words,       
   shows how country r‘s value added created in sector j fulfills country s‘s total 
final demand;       
   represents how country s‘s final demand for product i is fulfilled by country r‘s 
value added created in all sectors. 
 
3.3 TiVA-based indicator for measuring revealed comparative advantage 
 
The concept of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) is primarily based on the theory of Ricardian 
comparative advantage. RCA represents the relative advantage or disadvantage of a certain country in 
international economics for a certain class of goods or services. The most widely used indicator of RCA 
(Béla Balassa, 1965) is given as follows: 
 
    
   
   
     
    
 
       
,       (14) 
 
where    
  represents country r‘s exports of goods i and     represents the total exports of country r. 
When all countries‘ exports just include their domestic contents, the previous RCA is considered a 
reasonable indicator of a comparative advantage. However, as previously mentioned, when a larger 
volume of intermediate imports are embodied in exports, this indicator may lose its original 
interpretability. Using the concept of sector-level or product-level TiVA proposed in this paper, a 
country‘s comparative advantage can be remeasured in the following two ways: 
 
     
   
      
       
       
 
         
        (15) 
     
   
      
       
       
 
         
 ,       (16) 
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where  
 
      
         
  
 , 
      
         
  
 , 
                      
 
         
 
    
 
In this definition,      
  represents the comparative advantage of country r‘s sector j in GVCs, and 
     
  shows country r‘s entire comparative advantage in providing value added to fulfill other countries‘ 
final demand on product i. 
 
3.4 Measuring “who produces intermediate products for whom” 
 
The previous section proposed TiVA-based indicators to measure spatial economic interdependence. 
These indicators are based on the international I–O model. In this model, both final demand item and 
value added item are treated as exogenous variables; trade in intermediate goods and services among 
countries is treated as an endogenous variable. Therefore, how a country‘s final demand affects other 
country‘s value added through trade in intermediate products can be determined. However, this indicator 
cannot show in detail the role that intermediate trade plays in international production networks. By still 
using an international I–O model, we propose a simple method to measure the role of intermediate trade 
in production networks.  
 
Given the same two-country I–O model as shown in Figure 6, according to the demand-driven I–O 
model, the intermediate transaction from country r to country s (     : a matrix representing country r‘s 
export of intermediate goods and services to country s) is formulated as follows: 
 
                                                   .  (17) 
 
Rearranging the above equation yields 
 
1=
              
       
+
              
       
+
              
       
+
              
       
 
        .        (18) 
 
Obviously, a, b, c, and d provide information on how intermediate exports from country r to country s end 
up or contribute to a country‘s final demand. This information can assist in answering the question ―who 
produces what for whom?,‖ and shows the spatial economic interdependence among countries from the 
viewpoint of the relationship between intermediate and final products. The following equation provides 
the general form for calculating how trade in intermediate products directly and indirectly contributes to 
different types of final demand across countries through international supply chains. 
 
    
                          ,     (18‘) 
 
where     
   shows the contribution rate of induced trade in intermediate products shipped from 
country R to S by country s‘s final demand for country r‘s products in a total intermediate transaction 
from country R to country S. When changing our viewpoint, the following indicator can also provide 
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alternative information on the aspect of ―who produces intermediate goods for whom‖: 
 
    
                                           (18) 
 
where     
    shows the contribution rate of induced trade in intermediate products from country R to S 
by country s‘s final demands for country r‘s products in the total induced global trade through the same 
final demands. 
 
If more attention is paid to international transactions (without considering the domestic trade in 
intermediate and final products), the following two indicators can provide an understanding of how 
intercountry trade in intermediate products is induced by intercountry trade in final products: 
 
     
   
              
                      
            (19) 
 
     
    
              
                      
           (20) 
 
where      
   shows the contribution rate of country r‘s export of final products to country s in the 
inducement of international trade in intermediate products shipped from country R to S.      
    shows 
the share of induced international trade in intermediate products shipped from country R to S in the total 
inducement of international intermediate trade in terms of country s‘s final demand on the products made 
in country r. 
 
4. Empirical results in measuring GVCs and regional economic integration 
 
This section applies the indicators proposed in Section 3 to the 1995 and 2005 international I–O table 
constructed using the OECD‘s and IDE-JETRO‘s I–O tables and OECD bilateral trade data. To facilitate 
showing the evolution of GVCs and regional economic integration, the global economy is simply divided 
into several groups such as EUROPE, EU15, the rest of EUROPE, NAFTA, South America, ASIA, East 
Asia, ASEAN, the rest of ASIA, and the rest of the world
5
. 
 
4.1 Trade in value added share across regions 
 
Table 3 shows the share of bilateral TiVA in total cross-border TiVA for 1995 and 2005. Through the 
columns, each figure shows how a specific region‘s domestic final demand contributes to (impacts) other 
regions‘ value added creation. In other words, the figure seen column-wise is considered the imported 
value of a specific region added from other regions, and each figure seen row-wise shows how a specific 
region exports value added to the other regions. Obviously, for most regions or subregions, the 
intraregional value added transactions account for a relatively large share compared with the interregional 
figure. Focusing just on the intraregional transaction shows that EUROPE accounts for almost 22.7% in 
the global TiVA, followed by ASIA at 11.7% and NAFTA at 7.0% in 1995. This figure decreased for 
                                                   
5Appendix 2 shows the detailed members in different country groups. 
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most regions but increased for some developing countries groups except ASEAN between 1995 and 2005. 
Clearly, the intra and interregional value chains for different country groups show very different presence. 
This is mainly due to the difference of the position, participation degree and role that regions play in the 
global value chains.  
 
When looking at the interregional TiVA, certain interesting features are summarized as follows. (1) EU15 
lost the potential for both TiVA import (see figure column-wise) and TiVA export (see figures row-wise) 
from/to other regions except for the rest of EUROPE, clearly indicating that EU15‘s relative presence in 
GVCs decreased, but its linkage with the rest of EUROPE in terms of TiVA strengthened. (2) NAFTA 
lost its potential for TiVA export but enhanced its TiVA import over time, which also represents the 
increasing value added gain in developing economies through TiVA from NAFTA. (3) The rest of 
EUROPE showed a rapidly increasing tendency for both TiVA import from and TiVA export to other 
regions. Although the absolute share in global TiVA from the rest of EUROPE is still small, the region‘s 
remarkable performance clearly illustrates how it benefited from the EUROPE‘s ongoing regional 
integration. (4) In general, ASEAN lost its TiVA import and export potential over time in global GVCs. 
Recalling the concept of TiVA, even if a country is large or has significant dependence on foreign trade, it 
is not guaranteed to get much more TiVA because TiVA depends on the scale of trade, the value added 
ratio, and the country‘s position in international production networks. (5) East Asia enhanced TiVA 
exports to EUROPE, NAFTA, especially to the rest of EUROPE, and the rest of ASIA. (6)The presence 
of the rest of EUROPE, the rest of ASIA, and the rest of the world in global TiVA shows a strong 
increasing trend, which is considered clear evidence that the distribution of TiVA at the worldwide level 
has become much flatter and more diverse. 
 
4.2 TiVA at the country level 
 
Figure 7 shows the TiVA at country level for 2005. The main features of Figure 7 are summarized as 
follows. (1) The main sources of both TiVA import and TiVA export for most countries originate from the 
intraregional TiVA. Not surprisingly, because the cost of organizing production networks depends on 
geographic distance, a neighbor country should always be the first choice when looking for trade patterns 
if other conditions remain unchanged. This feature also reflects the magnitude of a country‘s degree of 
participation in GVCs. (2) A comparison of TiVA import and TiVA export clearly shows that most 
countries export more value added to NAFTA than their imports from NAFTA. This phenomenon occurs 
partly because some of the United States‘s production capacity for merchandized goods has moved to 
developing economies through FDI. (3) In addition, NAFTA has a relatively close relationship in terms of 
TiVA with ASIA countries compared with EUROPE, which is clearly reflected in the strong connections 
among the production networks in the Asia-Pacific region (ASIA and NAFTA). (4) ASIA shows a similar 
or relatively large performance in EUROPE‘s value chain system compared with NAFTA.  
 
4.3 TiVA in terms of final and intermediate products 
 
As noted in the previous section, an I–O-based decomposition technique can separately measure the 
TiVA from the contribution of trade in intermediate and final products. Tables 4 and 5 show the shares of 
interregional and intraregional TiVA in total TiVA for intermediate and final products, respectively. The 
key findings are summarized as follows. 1) The TiVA in terms of trade in intermediate products accounts 
for more than 60% of total international TiVA, and this presence increased between 1995 and 2005 (from 
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62.1% to 66.2%). This increase indicates that trade in intermediate goods played an increasing and 
dominant role in the value added creation system through international production networks. 2) Except 
for the rest of EUROPE and the rest of ASIA, the TiVA for most regions related to trade in final products 
decreased rapidly both interregionally and intraregionally. In contrast, except for ASIA‘s TiVA imports 
and NAFTA‘s TiVA exports to ASIA, the presence of GVCs for most regions increased rapidly from both 
inter and intraregional aspects concerning the TiVA in terms of trade in intermediate products. This 
phenomenon clearly implies that the ongoing regional integration is primarily driven by the expansion of 
intraregional trade in intermediate goods with respect to value creation and distribution, especially for the 
rest of EUROPE and the East Asia region. 3) Although the ASIA area showed an overall increase in the 
presence of intraregional TiVA in terms of intermediate products, the linkages between ASEAN and East 
Asia decreased between 1995 and 2005. ASEAN and East Asia are linked through international trade, but 
their interaction with respect to TiVA showed lower performance. Confirming the difference in the 
performance of regional integration between EUROPE and ASIA is easy by analyzing the interaction 
between EU15 – the rest of EUROPE relationship and East Asia – ASEAN relationship. 
 
4.4 Who produces intermediate products for whom? 
 
As shown in previous sections, international trade statistics provide a very direct image of the evolution 
of the global trade structure. The concept of TiVA is proposed to measure the degree of regional 
integration using both direct and indirect linkages. However, all of these measurements provide a kind of 
―final‖ image of regional economic integration, rather than showing the step-by-step interaction among 
countries within a target region. Using the measure proposed in Section 3.4 captures a more detailed 
image of regional economic integration. 
 
Figures 8 and 9 show the type of bilateral trade in final products that induces international trade in 
intermediate products. In other words, these figures provide detailed information on who produces 
intermediate products for whom. For example, when France imported goods and services from Germany 
in 1995, the induced international trade in intermediate products was concentrated in Europe area, which 
surrounded certain trade hubs such as the United Kingdom, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. 
In addition, this trade in final goods and services that occurred within Europe (between France and 
Germany) also had a relatively large effect on Japan and the United States. Namely, France‘s import of a 
larger volume of final products from Germany induced a larger volume of international trade of 
intermediate products produced in Japan and the United States. Comparing this situation with that of 
2005 easily confirms very dramatic changes. For example, France‘s imports of final goods and services 
from Germany caused a higher volume of international trade in intermediate products within Europe, 
especially between EU15 and the rest of EUROPE, clearly indicating the evolution of ongoing regional 
integration within the EUROPE. In addition, in contrast to the situation in 1995, the fact that France‘s 
imports from Germany had a more significant effect on China‘s exports of intermediate products to 
countries throughout the world, especially to intra-East Asia trade, also provides the additional 
information on worldwide production networks that deepening regional integration causes shifts in 
simultaneous interregional relationships. Another example is the effect of Japan‘s imports of final goods 
and services from China (Figure 12). Obviously, in 1995, when Japan imported final products from China, 
the East Asia region tended to import a higher volume of intermediate products from NAFTA, the 
EUROPE, and East Asia. However, in 2005, the situation changed and international trade within ASIA 
became much flatter. Simultaneously, the induced interregional trade in intermediate products between 
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ASIA and EUROPE decreased. 
 
4.5 Alternative measurement of revealed comparative advantage 
 
As explained in the previous section, the traditional indicator of comparative advantage proposed by 
Balassa (1965) is only based on international trade data. The increasing vertical specialization in trade 
and fragmentation of production in international production networks prevents this measure from 
providing significant information because a country‘s exports tend to embody a higher percentage of 
other countries‘ contents (value added). Using the newly proposed measure of RCA based on the concept 
of TiVA enables the calculation of a new ranking of RCA across countries. The primary results for 
selected industries are shown in Tables 6 and 7 and easily confirm that the new measure of TiVA-based 
RCA provides very different information compared with that provided by traditional measures. For 
example, according to the traditional indicator for exports of office, accounting, and computing 
machinery, China ranked ninth in 1995. However, TiVA-based RCA for China indicates a lower ranking, 
precisely reflecting the fact that almost half of the exports of office, accounting, and computing 
machinery products made in China are processed goods with a large share of imported content. Therefore, 
the traditional RCA indicator may overestimate the relative ranking of China in terms of its comparative 
advantage. The figure for 2005 shows that the difference in China‘s ranking from these two measures 
narrowed, possibly implying that China exported a higher volume of domestic content or gained more 
value added by exporting office and computing machinery goods. In other words, China may have 
achieved a kind of industrial upgrade in its production of computing machinery. Alternatively, 
multinational enterprises in China may have increased their local procurement rate. In contrast, Mexico‘s 
traditional RCA- and TiVA-based RCA rankings in the motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers sector 
are the highest. The fact that Mexico ranks first is no surprise considering the fact that the country‘s 
primary export goods are motor-related products, the majority of which are shipped to the United States. 
Japan and Germany maintained their RCA for both measurements. The TiVA-based RCA of Korea is 
much higher than its traditional RCA and is close to Germany and Japan, implying that evaluating only 
the export of motor-vehicle-related products without considering the value added creation potential of 
Korea‘s motor sector may underestimate Korea‘s true performance in this sector in GVCs.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
International I–O tables have been considered a very useful source of data for analyses of production 
networks, international fragmentation production, GVCs, etc. This paper uses the new I–O-based concept, 
TiVA, to measure the evolution of GVCs and regional economic integration. Compared with the 
traditional measure based on international trade statistics, the TiVA-based measure provides a more 
detailed image of countries‘ positions and degrees of participation in international production networks 
from both direct and indirect perspectives. In addition, using the I–O-based decomposition technique, the 
TiVA measurement can be separated by the factor of trade in final and intermediate goods, helping us 
understand how intermediate goods function and driving the evolution of regional economic integration. 
Furthermore, we redefine the indicator of RCA using the concept of TiVA. Compared to the traditional 
trade-statistics-based indicator, this new indicator can provide a more reasonable measure of a country‘s 
comparative advantage because the potential of a country‘s value added export is fully considered. In 
addition, on the basis of the traditional international I–O model, induced international trade in 
intermediate goods is identified by different trade transactions in final goods. Therefore, capturing more 
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detailed information on who produces what for whom is possible, and additional information on regional 
economic integration that may be masked by traditional trade statistics becomes available.  
 
The primary findings of the empirical analysis are summarized as follows. 1) EUROPE has been a 
high-level integrated region in terms of its high intraregional TiVA. In addition, the emergence of the rest 
of EUROPE has resulted in very dynamic effects on the EUROPE‘s regional integration. The deepening 
and strengthening of the interaction between EU15 and the rest of EUROPE has been the most important 
feature of the ongoing regional integration of the EUROPE. 2) In contrast, ASIA as a whole shows a 
slight decreasing presence of regional integration in terms of intraregional TiVA. When tracing a more 
detailed interaction within ASIA, the intraregional interaction for ASEAN shows decreasing, but East 
Asia shows increasing performance; however, the interregional dependency in terms of TiVA between 
the two regions shows a decreasing tendency compared to EU15 and the rest of EUROPE. 3) The 
contribution from trade in intermediate goods accounted for 66% of the total international TiVA in 2005, 
clearly implying that the deepening regional integration is primarily driven by the expansion in 
intraregional trade in intermediate goods with respect to value creation and distribution. 4) The structural 
change as measured by the induced international trade in intermediate goods through selected bilateral 
trade in final goods clearly confirms that integrated production networks within the EUROPE and ASIA 
were enhanced through trade in intermediate products between 1995 and 2005. 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Ahmad. N., H., Escaith, S., Miroudot, C., Webb, and N., Yamamo (2011), ―Trade in Value-Added: 
Concepts, Methodologies, and Challenges‖, OECD/WTO. 
 
Baldwin, R. (2011), ―21st century regionalism: Filling the gap between 21st century trade and 20th 
century trade rules‖, CEPR Policy insight, 56. 
 
Baldwin, R. (2012), ―21st century trade and the 21st century WTO‖, Perspectives from Around the World, 
014, RIETI. 
 
Balassa, B. (1965), Trade Liberalization and Revealed Comparative Advantage, the Manchester School, 
33, 99-123. 
 
Barker, K.D. and N. Yamano (2012), ―International comparative evidence on global value chains‖, STI 
Working paper, 2012/3. 
 
Carson, S. (2007), Boeing Commercial Airplanes, presentation documents from Boeing‘s website, 
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/financial/conferences/2007ir_investor_carson.pdf 
 
Cherry, J. (2011), ―Making friends with the hydra European expectations of the EUROPE–Korea Free 
Trade Agreement‖, European Journal of East Asian Studies, 10(1), 59 -83. 
 
15
Dedrick, J., K.L.Kraemer and G. Linden (2010), ―Who profits from innovation in global value chains?: A 
study of the iPod and notebook PCs‖, Industrial and Corporate Change, 19 (1), 81-116. 
 
Dunning, J. H., M. Fujita and N. Yakova, (2007), ―Some macro-data on the regionalisation/globalisation 
debate: A comment on the Rugman/Verbeke analysis‖, Journal of International Business Studies, 38(1), 
177-199. 
 
Escaith, H. (2008), ―Measuring trade in value added in the new industrial economy: statistical 
implications‖, MPRA Paper, 14454. 
 
Foster, N., R. Stehrer and G. Vries (2012), ―Trade in value added and factors: A comprehensive 
approach‖, WIOD Working Paper, 80, 1-22. 
 
Fukasaku, K., B. Meng and N. Yamano (2011), ―Recent development in Asian economic integration: 
Measuring trade integration and fragmentation‖, OECD STI Working Paper, 2011/3. 
 
Hiratsuka, D., and F. Kimura (2008), East Asia’s Economic Integration - Progress and Benefit -, Palgrave 
Macmillan IDE-JETRO Series. 
 
Hummels, D., J. Ishii and K.M. Yi (2001), ―The nature and growth of vertical specialization in world 
trade‖. Journal of International Economics, 54(1), 75 - 96. 
 
Johnson R.C. and G. Noguera (2011) ―Accounting for intermediates: Production sharing and trade in 
value added‖, Journal of International Economics, 86 (2), 224-236. 
 
Koopman, R., Z. Wang and S.J. Wei (2008), ―How much of Chinese exports is really made in China? 
Assessing domestic value-added when processing trade is pervasive‖, NBER Working Paper, 14109.  
 
Koopman, R., W. Powers, Z. Wang and S.J. Wei (2010), ―Give credit where credit is due: Tracing value 
added in global production chains‖, NBER Working Paper, 16426. 
 
Kuroiwa, I. (2006), ―Rules of origin and local content in East Asia‖, IDE Discussion Paper, 78. 
 
Kuroiwa, I., and T.M., Heng (2008), Production Networks and Industrial Clusters: Integrating 
Economies in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Linden, G., J. Dedrick, and K.L. Kraemer (2009), ―Innovation and job creation in a global economy: The 
case of Apple‘s iPod‖, Working Paper, Personal Computing Industry Center, UC Irvine. 
 
Meng, B., N. Yamano and C. Webb (2011), ―Application of factor decomposition techniques to vertical 
specialisation measurements‖, Journal of Applied Input-Output Analysis, 16. 
 
Miller, R.E. and P.D. Blair, (1985), Input-Output Analysis: Foundations and Extensions, Prentice hall, 
385. 
 
16
Miroudot, S., R. Lanz and A. Ragoussis (2009), ―Trade in intermediate goods and services‖, OECD 
Trade Policy Working Papers, 93, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kmlcxtdlk8r-en 
 
Murray, Ph. (2010), ―Comparative regional integration in the EUROPE and East Asia: Moving beyond 
integration snobbery‖, International Politics, 47, 308-323. 
 
Neffke, M. H. and R. Boschma, (2011), ―How do regions diversify over time? Industry relatedness and 
the development of new growth paths in regions‖, Economic Geography, 87, 237-265. 
 
Piekkari, R., P. Nell and P. Ghauri (2010), ―Regional management as a system‖, Management 
International Review, 50 (4), 513-532. 
 
Sierra, O. (2011), ―Shaping the neighbourhood? The EUROPE‘s impact on Georgia‖, Europe-Asia 
Studies, 63(8), 1377-1398. 
 
Stehrer, R., (2012), ―Trade in value added and value added in trade‖, WIIW working paper, 81. 
 
Rugman, A.M. and A. Verbeke (2004), ―A perspective on regional and global strategies of multinational 
enterprises‖, Journal of International Business Studies, 35, 3-18. 
 
Uchida, Y. and S. Inomata (2009), ―Vertical specialization in the time of the Economic Crisis‖, in 
Inomata S. and Y. Uchida (eds.), Asia Beyond the Crisis: Visions from International Input-Output 
Analyses, IDE Spot Survey 31, 70-83. 
 
UNCTAD/ Investment Report (2009), Transnational Corporation, agricultural production and 
development, Investment Report 2009, Geneva. 
 
Xing, Y., and N., Detert (2010), ―How the iPhone widens the United States trade deficit with the People‘s 
Republic of China‖, ADBI Working paper, 257. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17
Figure 1 Evolution of global trade in goods 
 
  
 
Figure 2 Categories’ share of global trade 
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Figure 3 Relative contributions to growth in total trade by end-use category 
 
  
 
Table 1 Contribution by country to growth in world trade (in terms of export) 
 
 
 
Table 2 Contribution by country to growth in world trade (in terms of import) 
 
 
 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Intermediate goods
Household consumption
Capital investment
Passenger cars
Packed medicaments
Personal computers
Personal phones
Valuables
Others 2002-2008
1996-2002
Rank 1996-2002 2002-2008 Rank 1996-2002 2002-2008
1 China 24.84% 17.86% 16 Thailand 1.42% 1.64%
2 Germany 8.30% 11.52% 17 Canada 3.96% 1.58%
3 USA 5.80% 6.91% 18 India 1.24% 1.54%
4 Rest of world 4.28% 5.60% 19 Poland 1.69% 1.53%
5 Japan 1.54% 5.36% 20 Mexico 6.97% 1.46%
6 France 2.89% 4.05% 21 Malaysia 2.46% 1.39%
7 Italy 0.14% 3.57% 22 Sweden -0.10% 1.36%
8 Korea 4.90% 3.50% 23 Czech Rep. 1.90% 1.32%
9 Netherlands 1.66% 3.09% 24 Austria 1.44% 1.28%
10 Belgium, Luxembourg 0.63% 2.45% 25 Australia -0.10% 1.23%
11 Chinese Taipei 3.47% 2.26% 26 Singapore -0.11% 1.11%
12 United Kingdom 0.61% 2.23% 27 Ireland 6.68% 1.00%
13 Spain 2.37% 2.01% 28 Russian Federation 0.56% 0.94%
14 Brazil 1.14% 1.94% 29 Turkey 1.46% 0.92%
15 Switzerland 0.06% 1.87% 30 Indonesia 1.13% 0.87%
Sum 93.23% 93.39%
Rank Country name 1996-2002 2002-2008 Rank Country name 1996-2002 2002-2008
1 Rest of world 5.54% 12.88% 16 India 1.38% 2.28%
2 China 14.23% 9.61% 17 Poland 1.81% 2.14%
3 USA 34.59% 9.15% 18 Singapore -1.99% 1.98%
4 Germany 5.93% 8.33% 19 Mexico 8.62% 1.84%
5 France 2.43% 4.86% 20 Turkey 0.60% 1.55%
6 Netherlands 0.17% 3.68% 21 Brazil -0.89% 1.55%
7 United Kingdom 6.52% 3.67% 22 Australia 0.73% 1.53%
8 Italy 3.43% 3.59% 23 Czech Rep. 1.53% 1.48%
9 Japan -1.65% 3.55% 24 Switzerland 0.48% 1.43%
10 Belgium, Luxembourg 4.05% 3.41% 25 Austria 0.43% 1.42%
11 Russian Federation 0.47% 3.17% 26 Thailand -1.03% 1.35%
12 Spain 3.85% 3.01% 27 Sweden 0.15% 1.31%
13 Hong Kong SAR of China 0.93% 2.87% 28 Chinese Taipei 0.76% 1.21%
14 Korea -0.26% 2.77% 29 Indonesia -1.70% 1.19%
15 Canada 5.49% 2.28% 30 Malaysia -0.13% 1.00%
Sum 96.47% 100.09%
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Figure 4 Evolution of global trade hubs 
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Figure 5 Single national I–O framework 
 
  
 
Figure 6 International I–O framework (two-country case) 
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Table 3 TiVA share across regions (%) 
 
  
 
EUROPE NAFTA ASIA ROW World
EU15
Rest of
EUROPE
ASEAN
East
Asia
Rest of
ASIA
EUROPE 22.7 21.6 1.1 4.6 0.7 5.2 1.2 3.4 0.6 5.1 38.3
EU15 21.8 20.8 1.0 4.6 0.6 5.1 1.2 3.3 0.6 4.9 37.0
Rest of EUROPE 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.3
NAFTA 3.8 3.7 0.1 7.0 0.7 5.7 1.0 4.2 0.6 1.5 18.7
0.5 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 2.1
ASIA 4.5 4.3 0.1 7.1 0.4 11.7 3.3 7.6 0.9 2.0 25.7
ASEAN 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.8 0.0 2.4 0.7 1.6 0.1 0.3 4.3
East Asia 3.4 3.3 0.1 6.0 0.3 8.3 2.4 5.2 0.6 1.5 19.5
Rest of ASIA 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 1.9
ROW 6.8 6.3 0.4 3.4 0.4 3.6 0.5 2.7 0.4 1.1 15.2
World 38.2 36.4 1.8 22.6 2.5 26.7 6.1 18.2 2.5 10.0 100.0
EUROPE NAFTA ASIA ROW World
EU15
Rest of
EUROPE
ASEAN
East
Asia
Rest of
ASIA
EUROPE 20.2 18.5 1.8 4.8 0.4 3.9 0.5 2.6 0.8 4.6 33.9
EU15 18.7 17.2 1.5 4.6 0.4 3.7 0.5 2.5 0.8 4.2 31.7
Rest of EUROPE 1.5 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 2.3
NAFTA 3.6 3.4 0.2 6.7 0.5 3.5 0.4 2.5 0.5 1.3 15.6
0.6 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 2.5
ASIA 5.4 5.0 0.4 7.5 0.4 10.7 1.9 7.5 1.3 2.6 26.6
ASEAN 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.8 0.0 2.2 0.5 1.4 0.3 0.3 4.1
East Asia 4.1 3.8 0.3 6.2 0.3 7.4 1.2 5.3 0.8 1.9 19.8
Rest of ASIA 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.2 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.4 2.7
ROW 7.5 6.9 0.6 5.3 0.4 6.0 0.6 4.2 1.2 2.1 21.4
World 37.4 34.5 2.9 24.9 1.9 24.7 3.5 17.3 3.9 11.0 100.0
EUROPE NAFTA ASIA ROW World
EU15
Rest of
EUROPE
ASEAN
East
Asia
Rest of
ASIA
EUROPE -10.9 -14.6 60.8 3.5 -34.8 -25.0 -58.5 -22.8 28.6 -10.8 -11.5
EU15 -14.3 -17.6 55.4 1.0 -35.7 -26.4 -59.2 -24.2 25.6 -14.8 -14.5
Rest of EUROPE 70.7 65.7 102.4 126.9 0.0 45.1 0.0 42.9 0.0 90.5 74.8
NAFTA -5.0 -6.8 51.3 -4.4 -34.0 -38.5 -54.8 -39.4 -3.4 -11.8 -16.6
23.2 20.2 0.0 41.4 -12.1 12.9 -29.8 13.4 0.0 14.2 17.7
ASIA 21.3 17.1 146.3 6.0 0.3 -8.6 -41.9 -1.2 52.1 30.6 3.8
ASEAN 4.7 1.6 0.0 1.8 9.5 -10.2 -25.0 -14.6 102.7 12.5 -3.7
East Asia 19.0 14.2 155.2 3.1 -5.1 -10.4 -49.1 1.6 39.1 27.3 1.9
Rest of ASIA 79.5 78.5 0.0 77.6 0.0 9.5 -13.6 8.4 55.4 83.2 40.5
ROW 11.6 9.7 40.4 56.7 -4.0 68.3 16.0 59.8 199.7 95.3 40.6
World -2.1 -5.4 62.7 10.5 -21.0 -7.5 -42.0 -4.8 57.6 9.5 0.0
Bilateral TiVA share in total TiVA for 1995 (%)
1995
South
America
South America
2005
South
America
1995-2005
South
America
South America
Change rate of bilateral TiVA share between 1995 and 2005 (%)
Bilateral TiVA share in total TiVA for 2005 (%)
South 
America
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Figure 7 TiVA share at the country level for 2005 (%) 
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Table 4 TiVA in terms of trade in intermediate goods across regions (%) 
 
 
  
 
EUROPE NAFTA ASIA ROW World
EU15
Rest of
EUROPE
ASEAN
East
Asia
Rest of
ASIA
EUROPE 14.0 13.4 0.7 3.1 0.4 2.9 0.7 1.9 0.4 3.0 23.5
EU15 13.5 12.9 0.6 3.0 0.4 2.9 0.6 1.9 0.4 2.9 22.6
Rest of EUROPE 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.9
NAFTA 2.8 2.7 0.1 4.3 0.4 3.7 0.6 2.7 0.4 1.0 12.2
0.4 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 1.6
ASIA 2.5 2.4 0.1 3.5 0.2 6.9 1.8 4.6 0.5 1.0 14.1
ASEAN 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.6 0.4 1.2 0.1 0.2 2.7
East Asia 1.8 1.8 0.1 2.8 0.2 4.5 1.3 2.8 0.3 0.7 10.0
Rest of ASIA 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 1.4
ROW 4.8 4.5 0.3 2.1 0.3 2.8 0.4 2.1 0.3 0.7 10.8
World 24.6 23.4 1.2 13.3 1.5 16.7 3.5 11.6 1.6 5.9 62.1
EUROPE NAFTA ASIA ROW World
EU15
Rest of
EUROPE
ASEAN
East
Asia
Rest of
ASIA
EUROPE 12.6 11.6 1.1 3.2 0.3 2.6 0.3 1.8 0.5 2.8 21.6
EU15 11.6 10.7 0.9 3.1 0.3 2.5 0.3 1.7 0.5 2.6 20.1
Rest of EUROPE 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.5
NAFTA 2.6 2.5 0.1 4.3 0.3 2.4 0.3 1.8 0.4 0.9 10.5
0.5 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 1.9
ASIA 3.1 2.9 0.2 4.0 0.3 7.1 1.1 5.1 0.9 1.4 15.8
ASEAN 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.6 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.2 2.8
East Asia 2.2 2.1 0.2 3.2 0.2 4.6 0.7 3.4 0.5 1.0 11.2
Rest of ASIA 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.2 1.8
ROW 5.6 5.1 0.4 3.9 0.3 5.2 0.5 3.7 0.9 1.5 16.4
World 24.5 22.6 1.9 15.8 1.4 17.8 2.3 12.8 2.7 6.8 66.2
EUROPE NAFTA ASIA ROW World
EU15
Rest of
EUROPE
ASEAN
East
Asia
Rest of
ASIA
EUROPE -10.0 -13.4 56.5 5.2 -25.0 -10.5 -52.3 -5.3 36.8 -7.6 -8.0
EU15 -13.5 -16.6 53.3 1.7 -25.6 -12.2 -52.4 -7.0 28.9 -12.1 -11.3
Rest of EUROPE 69.5 70.0 66.7 142.9 0.0 71.4 0.0 60.0 0.0 84.6 77.0
NAFTA -5.4 -7.0 62.5 0.5 -25.0 -34.2 -50.0 -34.7 -5.4 -13.1 -13.3
24.4 20.0 0.0 38.7 -14.3 16.3 -28.6 14.7 0.0 4.5 17.1
ASIA 23.0 18.9 133.3 15.0 13.0 2.8 -37.9 11.9 70.0 45.4 12.5
ASEAN 11.1 9.3 0.0 15.9 33.3 -2.5 -14.3 -10.3 109.1 40.0 5.6
East Asia 22.4 16.9 166.7 13.4 5.6 3.4 -46.6 21.4 53.1 44.9 12.6
Rest of ASIA 50.0 47.8 0.0 35.0 0.0 11.3 -7.7 10.2 62.5 66.7 26.8
ROW 15.6 13.5 51.7 79.9 6.9 83.7 32.5 76.3 200.0 106.8 52.1
World -0.5 -3.5 61.5 19.0 -11.8 6.3 -34.3 9.9 71.5 14.7 6.7
1995-2005
South
America
South America
Bilateral TiVA share in total TiVA in terms of intermediate products for 1995 (%)
Bilateral TiVA share in total TiVA in terms of intermediate products for 2005 (%)
Change rate of bilateral TiVA share between 1995 and 2005 (%)
1995
South
America
South America
2005
South
America
South 
America
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Table 5 TiVA in terms of trade in final goods across regions (%) 
 
 
 
 
EUROPE NAFTA ASIA ROW World
EU15
Rest of
EUROPE
ASEAN
East
Asia
Rest of
ASIA
EUROPE 8.7 8.3 0.4 1.6 0.3 2.3 0.6 1.5 0.2 2.1 14.9
EU15 8.4 8.0 0.4 1.5 0.3 2.2 0.6 1.5 0.2 2.0 14.4
Rest of EUROPE 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4
NAFTA 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.7 0.3 2.0 0.4 1.4 0.2 0.5 6.6
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5
ASIA 1.9 1.9 0.1 3.7 0.2 4.8 1.5 3.0 0.4 1.0 11.6
ASEAN 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 1.6
East Asia 1.6 1.6 0.1 3.2 0.1 3.8 1.1 2.4 0.3 0.8 9.5
Rest of ASIA 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5
ROW 1.9 1.8 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.4 4.4
World 13.7 13.0 0.6 9.3 0.9 10.0 2.6 6.5 0.9 4.1 37.9
EUROPE NAFTA ASIA ROW World
EU15
Rest of
EUROPE
ASEAN
East
Asia
Rest of
ASIA
EUROPE 7.6 6.9 0.7 1.6 0.1 1.3 0.2 0.8 0.3 1.8 12.4
EU15 7.1 6.5 0.6 1.5 0.1 1.2 0.2 0.8 0.3 1.7 11.6
Rest of EUROPE 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7
NAFTA 1.0 0.9 0.1 2.4 0.2 1.1 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.5 5.1
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6
ASIA 2.3 2.2 0.2 3.6 0.1 3.7 0.8 2.4 0.5 1.2 10.8
ASEAN 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.3
East Asia 1.9 1.7 0.1 3.0 0.1 2.8 0.5 1.9 0.4 0.9 8.6
Rest of ASIA 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.9
ROW 2.0 1.8 0.2 1.4 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.6 5.0
World 13.0 11.9 1.1 9.1 0.6 6.9 1.2 4.5 1.2 4.2 33.8
EUROPE NAFTA ASIA ROW World
EU15
Rest of
EUROPE
ASEAN
East
Asia
Rest of
ASIA
EUROPE -12.4 -16.5 70.7 0.6 -50.0 -43.8 -66.1 -45.3 17.4 -15.2 -16.9
EU15 -15.7 -19.0 57.9 -0.6 -50.0 -44.4 -65.5 -45.9 18.2 -18.6 -19.5
Rest of EUROPE 68.8 57.1 150.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 65.9
NAFTA -4.0 -7.1 25.0 -12.1 -46.4 -46.3 -61.0 -48.6 0.0 -9.6 -22.7
33.3 22.2 0.0 38.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.4 24.5
ASIA 19.1 14.9 150.0 -2.5 -18.8 -24.6 -46.9 -20.6 28.9 16.0 -6.7
ASEAN -8.3 -8.7 0.0 -13.2 0.0 -24.4 -35.5 -25.6 75.0 -13.3 -17.9
East Asia 14.9 11.0 160.0 -6.0 -21.4 -26.8 -51.4 -21.3 20.7 11.5 -9.6
Rest of ASIA 140.0 166.7 0.0 177.8 0.0 8.0 -14.3 0.0 50.0 128.6 78.8
ROW 2.1 0.6 23.1 17.2 -27.3 10.5 -28.6 -3.7 175.0 70.3 12.7
World -5.0 -8.6 67.2 -1.6 -34.8 -30.5 -52.1 -30.8 32.6 2.2 -10.8
1995-2005
South
America
South America
Bilateral TiVA share in total TiVA in terms of final products for 2005 (%)
Bilateral TiVA share in total TiVA in terms of final products for 1995 (%)
Change rate of bilateral TiVA share between 1995 and 2005 (%)
1995
South
America
South America
2005
South
America
South 
America
25
Figure 8 Induced trade in intermediate goods by France’s imports from Germany (1995, 2005) 
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Figure 9 Induced trade in intermediate goods by Japan’s imports from China (1995, 2005) 
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Table 6 Comparative advantage indicator based on TiVA for selected industries (1995) 
 
 
1995
Rank Country RCA Country RCA by TiVA Country RCA Country RCA by TiVA
1 Singapore 6.80 Ireland 9.55 Mexico 3.01 Mexico 4.50
2 Ireland 5.27 Singapore 6.50 Spain 2.69 Japan 2.47
3 Chinese Taipei 3.60 Chinese Taipei 3.21 Canada 2.45 Germany 2.42
4 Mexico 3.16 Mexico 2.86 Japan 2.19 Spain 2.30
5 Japan 2.13 Poland 1.95 Germany 2.00 Canada 2.05
6 United States 1.59 Japan 1.81 Belgium 1.76 Sweden 1.80
7 Hong Kong 1.49 United Kingdom 1.52 Sweden 1.61 Belgium 1.47
8 United Kingdom 1.47 United States 1.52 Slovenia 1.32 Korea 1.27
9 China 1.06 Hong Kong 1.47 France 1.20 Poland 1.14
10 Poland 0.92 RoW 1.03 Austria 1.17 Austria 1.10
11 Korea 0.83 France 0.97 Portugal 1.06 France 0.99
12 France 0.80 Korea 0.53 Poland 0.98 Hungary 0.97
13 Canada 0.57 Australia 0.47 Hungary 0.94 Brazil 0.90
14 Australia 0.46 Spain 0.47 United States 0.94 United Kingdom 0.83
15 Spain 0.39 China 0.47 Italy 0.84 Argentina 0.77
16 Finland 0.33 Germany 0.42 Korea 0.84 Italy 0.72
17 Netherlands 0.32 Netherlands 0.34 Brazil 0.84 Slovenia 0.64
18 Italy 0.31 Romania 0.33 United Kingdom 0.81 Portugal 0.63
19 Germany 0.28 Italy 0.31 Argentina 0.78 South Africa 0.57
20 Romania 0.28 Sweden 0.27 South Africa 0.72 United States 0.50
21 Sweden 0.15 Finland 0.24 Czech Republic 0.56 Czech Republic 0.44
22 Norway 0.13 Argentina 0.19 Slovak Republic 0.49 Turkey 0.43
23 Argentina 0.13 Canada 0.17 Netherlands 0.35 China 0.42
24 RoW 0.13 Slovak Republic 0.14 Turkey 0.32 Chinese Taipei 0.41
25 Hungary 0.10 Norway 0.12 India 0.28 Slovak Republic 0.37
26 Czech Republic 0.08 Slovenia 0.11 Chinese Taipei 0.26 India 0.31
27 Switzerland 0.08 Denmark 0.10 China 0.21 Netherlands 0.30
28 Estonia 0.08 Estonia 0.10 Australia 0.19 Thailand 0.28
29 Denmark 0.06 Czech Republic 0.09 Romania 0.18 Finland 0.27
30 Brazil 0.06 Hungary 0.09 Finland 0.17 Malaysia 0.27
Office, accounting & computing machinery Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers
28
Table 7 Comparative advantage indicator based on TiVA for selected industries (2005) 
 
 
2005
Rank Country RCA Country RCA by TiVA Country RCA Country RCA by TiVA
1 Mexico 5.48 Singapore 7.93 Mexico 2.75 Mexico 3.83
2 Singapore 4.49 Thailand 5.81 Japan 2.46 Japan 3.02
3 Ireland 4.03 Mexico 4.84 Germany 2.44 Germany 2.85
4 China 4.01 Hong Kong 4.65 Spain 2.33 Hungary 2.49
5 Thailand 3.88 Ireland 3.81 Slovak Republic 2.18 Czech Republic 2.30
6 Hong Kong 3.71 China 2.66 Canada 2.13 Korea 2.14
7 Czech Republic 1.91 Hungary 2.24 Hungary 2.06 Spain 2.11
8 Hungary 1.72 Philippines 1.92 Czech Republic 1.93 Turkey 1.72
9 Japan 1.26 Japan 1.24 Poland 1.79 Sweden 1.67
10 Philippines 1.04 United States 0.86 France 1.76 Slovak Republic 1.60
11 Chinese Taipei 0.83 United Kingdom 0.67 Sweden 1.66 Austria 1.58
12 United States 0.69 Korea 0.55 Austria 1.65 Canada 1.57
13 Korea 0.47 Germany 0.48 Turkey 1.52 Poland 1.48
14 United Kingdom 0.41 Chinese Taipei 0.48 Korea 1.51 France 1.23
15 Germany 0.30 RoW 0.46 Portugal 1.43 Belgium 1.18
16 India 0.30 India 0.39 Belgium 1.41 Portugal 1.13
17 Netherlands 0.26 Czech Republic 0.35 Slovenia 1.38 Romania 1.09
18 France 0.25 Sweden 0.31 Brazil 1.30 Slovenia 0.96
19 Canada 0.23 France 0.30 United States 1.01 Argentina 0.91
20 Spain 0.20 Spain 0.27 Argentina 0.93 Brazil 0.89
21 Sweden 0.17 Netherlands 0.25 South Africa 0.91 Thailand 0.89
22 Italy 0.13 Canada 0.20 Thailand 0.83 South Africa 0.80
23 Brazil 0.13 Denmark 0.19 Italy 0.80 United States 0.69
24 Portugal 0.12 Italy 0.16 Romania 0.58 Italy 0.67
25 Denmark 0.09 Portugal 0.16 Netherlands 0.49 Philippines 0.57
26 Poland 0.08 Poland 0.15 United Kingdom 0.49 Netherlands 0.48
27 RoW 0.08 Slovenia 0.15 Philippines 0.47 United Kingdom 0.47
28 Austria 0.07 Slovak Republic 0.14 India 0.33 Estonia 0.43
29 Slovenia 0.06 Austria 0.10 Australia 0.28 New Zealand 0.35
30 Slovak Republic 0.05 Switzerland 0.10 Estonia 0.27 Finland 0.29
Office, accounting & computing machinery Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers
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Appendix 1 
 
For simplicity, the growth rate of total trade in goods is given as follows: 
 
    
       
    
 ,        (a1) 
 
where     represents the growth rate of total trade q from the year t − 1 to t.    represents the trade 
value for year t. The previous equation is easily rewritten as follows: 
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where   
  represents the trade value in terms of category i for year t. Further rearrangement of the 
right-hand side of the previous equation provides the growth rate of total trade as follows: 
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where    
  represents the share of category i in the total trade for year t, and    
  represents the 
exact growth rate of trade for category i from year t − 1 to year t. Then, the contribution rate of trade 
in category i to growth of total trade is defined as 
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Obviously,    
 
    and the relative contribution rate of category (  
 ) depend not only on its share 
in total trade (   
   ) but also its growth rate (   
 ). 
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Appendix 2 Country groups 
 
 
 
 
EUROPE
(EU member)
EU15
the rest
of EUROPE
NAFTA
South
America
ASIA ASEAN East Asia
the rest
of ASIA
ROW
1 Australia 1 1
2 Austria 1 1
3 Belgium 1 1
4 Canada 1
5 Czech Republic 1 1
6 Denmark 1 1
7 Finland 1 1
8 France 1 1
9 Germany 1 1
10 Greece 1 1
11 Hungary 1 1
12 Iceland 1
13 Ireland 1 1
14 Italy 1 1
15 Japan 1 1
16 Korea 1 1
17 Luxembourg 1 1
18 Mexico 1
19 Netherlands 1 1
20 New Zealand 1 1
21 Norway 1
22 Poland 1 1
23 Portugal 1 1
24 Slovak Republic 1 1
25 Spain 1 1
26 Sweden 1 1
27 Switzerland 1
28 Turkey 1
29 United Kingdom 1 1
30 United States 1
31 Argentina 1
32 Brazil 1
33 China 1 1
34 Chinese Taipei 1 1
35 India 1 1
36 Indonesia 1 1
37 Israel 1
38 Russian Federation 1
39 Singapore 1 1
40 South Africa 1
41 Hong Kong 1 1
42 Chile 1
43 Estonia 1 1
44 Slovenia 1 1
45 Malaysia 1 1
46 Philippines 1 1
47 Thailand 1 1
48 Romania 1 1
49 Viet Nam 1 1
50 Saudi Arabia 1
51 Bulgaria 1
52 Cyprus 1 1
53 RoW 1
Sum 23 15 8 3 3 14 6 5 3 10
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